APPLICATION SECURITY, INC.

Securing Databases With an SCAP Compatible Toolset

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Application Security, Inc.

Agenda

- Corporate Background
- The Database Security Challenge
- SCAP for the Database

Corporate Background

- Database security software company
- Headquartered in NY
  - Offices: U.S., U.K., France and Belgium
- Industry-leading Database Security & Auditing solution
  - Most awarded database security solution on the market
  - Solution of choice for auditors and security consultants
  - Complete Database Security
    - Discovery, vulnerability assessment, activity monitoring, auditing
  - Common Criteria in process
- Industry-leading customer base
  - **900+ customers**
- Top-tier investors and partners
  - Visa (financial), Paladin (national security)…..
- Strategic Relationships:
  - Security Technology Vendors – McAfee, ArcSight, etc.

Sample Government Customers



Database Security Best Practices



1. Discovery
2. Vulnerability assessment and prioritization
3. Remediation
4. Residual vulnerability mapping
5. Monitoring policy deployment
   - Patch-gap policies
   - Privileged user monitoring policies
   - User and behavior policies
6. Report customization and publishing
7. ASAP update scheduling and policy tuning
8. Integration: SIM/SEM etc.

SCAP Components – Database Readiness

- **CVE**: In good shape. Many database vulnerabilities listed, more being added.
- **CPE**: Looking good with v2, high-level database platforms are covered.
- **CCE**: Currently no elements defined for database configurations.
- **CVSS**: Ready. Oracle using CVSS today to score all new vulnerabilities.
- **XCCDF**: Open Framework, can be used to describe database scan policies.
- **OVAL**: Not ready to implement database checks yet

Application Security – Getting Involved

- Working to become SCAP compatible in 2007.
  - Focus on CVE, CPE, and CCE Infrastructure
  - Follow up with CVSS and XCCDF
- Driving SCAP to the database
  - Engaged with MITRE on entering new CVEs
  - Joined CCE WG
  - Examining implementing the first Database Scanning Policy in XCCDF
  - Working with Oracle and other database vendors to assign CVSS scores to new vulnerabilities

SCAP Report Example – Database Inventory Report



IP Address: 172.16.0.54 pr.nycapt35k.com

Port: 50000	DB2 Database (DB2:SAMPLE)	cpe:///ibm:db2_universal_database:8.0
Port: 50000	DB2 Instance (DB2)	cpe:///ibm:db2_universal_database:8.0

Number of Applications Found on IP Address 172.16.0.54: 2

IP Address: 172.16.0.59 mercury

Port: 1433	Microsoft SQL Server 2000 (MSSQLSERVER)	cpe:///microsoft:sql_server:2000
Port: 1434	Microsoft SQL Server Redirector	cpe:///cpe_no_match

Number of Applications Found on IP Address 172.16.0.59: 2

IP Address: 172.16.0.100 ghost10.nycapt35k.com

Port: 1433	Microsoft SQL Server 2000 (MSSQLSERVER)	cpe:///microsoft:sql_server:2000
Port: 1434	Microsoft SQL Server Redirector	cpe:///cpe_no_match

Number of Applications Found on IP Address 172.16.0.100: 2

IP Address: 172.16.0.129 ow8170

Port: 1521	Oracle External Proc (PLSExtProc)	cpe:///cpe_no_match
Port: 1521	Oracle9i Database (jpdb)	cpe:///oracle:oracle_9i_database_release_2
Port: 1521	Oracle9i Database (ora92)	cpe:///oracle:oracle_9i_database_release_2
Port: 1521	Oracle9i Listener	cpe:///oracle:listener

Number of Applications Found on IP Address 172.16.0.129: 4

SCAP Report Example – Database Vulnerability Report



High	50.0 %
Informational	16.0 %
Low	18.0 %
Medium	16.0 %
Total:	100.0 %

High Risk | Medium Risk | Low Risk | Informational

Agent jobs privilege escalation

Description: Permissions to escalate privileges through the SQL Agent have not been removed.

Versions: Microsoft SQL Server 7.0 and 2000

CVE: CVE-2002-0721 **CCE:** CCE-NO-MATCH **CPE:** cpe:///Microsoft:sql_server:20000

References: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-043.asp
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5483

Summary: A security issue exists that allows privilege escalation to be done through the Agent service. By default, the public group is allowed to create jobs that the Agent runs. By crafting a malicious job using extended stored procedures